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The well-known psychologist, philosopher and historian of Ukraine give their comments.
As the law banning religious organisations affiliated with the aggressor country is being prepared and comes into force, the Ukrainian mass media is publishing articles saying that the Moscow Patriarchate is getting ready for unity, but that due to its conflict past with the OCU, it needs to stay under the canonical umbrella of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and then one day it may enter into dialogue with the OCU.
The hypothesis is «flavoured» with accusations bysome church theorists (most of whom neither livein Ukraine nor serve in Ukraine) that neither side (neither the MP nor the OCU) wants unity. Thisis a kind of levelling the parties.
Our resource decided to try to investigate howtruly sincere are the intentions of the MP hierarchy in Ukraine to change the vector andmove away from Moscow. After all, peopleshould be prepared for the changes. Are there atleast minimal attempts to transform the mood oftheir own faithful and the ordinary, not alwayseducated clergy?
The monitoring conducted by our team wasintended to determine whether the clergy of theMoscow Patriarchate make any changes in theeducation of the faithful. Since unity is the fruitof the efforts of all, both the faithful (who in theUOC-MP have great trust in their clergy) and theclergy themselves.
During six weeks, we monitored the tone andnarratives of both social media posts created forordinary believers of the Moscow Patriarchateand the messages of official representatives ofthis jurisdiction. We analysed them on theFacebook pages of the resource. Then wesummarised them and asked renowned analysts inUkraine, people who have undisputed authority insociety, to comment.
First, let’s briefly enumerate the key messages ofthe Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, which areconveyed on the pages associated with thisjurisdiction.
1. «The authorities are God-fighting», they are «de-Christianising» society.
2. The OCU is «graceless», we should not betrayour patriarch (Kirill).
3. Priests and faithful continue to share theirthoughts about «persecutions», the wrongness ofautocephaly and «an attack on faith», dependingon their level of intelligence. «Persecutions» areto come before the coming of the Antichrist, «westand in the faith».
4. The demand to renounce Moscow is «a demandto renounce the faith of the fathers». Co-servingwith the OCU will mean «loss of grace».
5. Official speakers of the MP, such as Klyment Vecheria, resort to the usual fake clichés: «The UOC is the largest religious community», «The UOC is patriotic». And the SSU opened cases against its clergy not because of treason, but because someone may have crossed the roadin correctly. The hierarch claims that no one sent them orders from Moscow, nor did they participate in the synods of the Moscow Patriarchate. Although Patriarch Kirill did hold a Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Lavra.
6. The same Vecheria reports that Patriarch Bartholomew allegedly made a huge mistake, which, according to the spokesman of the MP, must be corrected by a hypothetical (mythical) council of the Local Churches.
At the same time, the hierarch was unable to answer the journalist’s question about whichChurch was the mother of the MP in U, saying that let’s (again) wait for the council, where the ROC would be able to level the OCU according to its dream.
7. The rector of Kyiv Theological Academy, Sylvester Stoichev, continued: «We have doubts about the apostolic succession of the OCU bishops… Even though Fanar keeps trying tojustify the validity of its decisions regardingordinations, referring to historical precedents thatfail to stand up to criticism, no conceptual explanation has been offered. And secondly, the clergy and believers of the OCU have repeatedly shown out right aggression against the communities of our Church. And until theseproblems are resolved, we cannot enter into Eucharistic communion with the OCU.»
In recent days, the Russian oligarch VadimNovinsky, a major sponsor of anti-Ukrainian andanti-autocephalous campaigns, has been quotedin the MP’s media publications as a speaker.
Thus, apparently, the Moscow Patriarchate is not asking for the same «canonical umbrells» from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As Stoichev said, «The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP – ed.) has it sown developed internal structure. We do not need to join any other Local Church for our fullexistence.»
And if any movements or attitudes towards Tsargrad exist, how to explain that the MP continues to publicly despise all hypothetical parties to the negotiations. What is it? We askedexperts to comment.
THE DESIRES OF THE MP IN UKRAINE EXTEND NO FURTHER THAN ST DANIEL’S MONASTERY IN MOSCOW
Valery Dymov, public philosopher, director of the Forum Centre for Public Information Technologies, who has been following the churchissue for over 30 years:
«The Moscow Patriarchate does not want unity. They don’t have the intention to want it. Their desires extend no further than St Daniel’s Monastery in Moscow. Perhaps there is a groupof people in the MP who would not mindseparating from Moscow. But this is a completelynon-independent structure.
I suppose that the MP has representatives in the Ecumenical Patriarchate who are trying to cause dissatisfaction with autocephaly, saying that it is possible to unite the snake and the hedgehog. ButI don’t see any possibilities. Because all potential negotiators with the MP have neither subjectivityn or independent thinking. As Kissinger once said, «A united Europe is great, but give me a phone number and someone to talk to». Who should theUkrainian representative office of the Moscow Church talk to?
We all watched the situation in Cherkasy, when a pro-Russian bishop instigated a provocation against a religious community that had joined the OCU. But let’s take a look in retrospect: theprovocation began when the late pro-autocephalous bishop Sofroniy had been replacedby his absolute opposite, Theodosius, who hadactually been appointed by Moscow. And this will always be the case. A healthy hierarch will be replaced by a pro-Kremlin figure. I remember the intentions and attempts at Ukrainisation under the late Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan. Allattempts were accompanied by Moscow’s interference, the eradication of the Ukrainian language, and the importation of vocational school students from Moscow.
Just have a look at Moscow’s satellites – Poland, Serbia, and even the non-independence of the Georgian Church. All the movements of the MP sare now dictated by the fact that laws have been passed to ban the ROC. Without the law, they would not even raise the issue. I understand that it is not existence that determines consciousness, but consciousness that determines existence, but where they will get Ukrainian consciousnessfrom if there is no catharsis and purification.
Until recently, lies have been successful, and they have been lying. Now it is no longer effective. I don’t see how these people can change without external influence. And they have external influence in Moscow, which will never let go. I fin the eyes of the Russians we are doctrinally «one people and one Church», then this undermines the markers of their identity. I suppose that Moscow will let the MP go only if they make it absolutely vassal to them, and then they may agree to «take a sign» from Constantinople. Something like a camouflage net. Formally, I can imagine it: a label taken from Constantinople for an absolutely vassal church. But why would Ukraine and Constantinople need it?
I THINK THAT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR AN IMAGE OF THE ENEMY, AND IT IS MOST CONVENIENT TO LOOK AMONG THEIR OWN PEOPLE
Oleg Pokalchuk, social psychologist, Ukrainian writer:
I think it’s useful to understand whet her there are really movements in the MP environment in the right (from Moscow) direction. And what is the nature of these movements? Is it out wardflirtation and an attempt at diplomacy, or is it a game with in the country?
Where are these kinds of messages posted? Arethe producers of such stories provoking external pressure or are they participating in a domestic political dialogue? Because in fact, this is also politics. I assume that, in military terms, the semovements of the MPs may be an imitation of a retreat. Like, we will step up, see the reaction ofboth Phanar and the OCU, and then decide. Vague statements and secret events with the involvement of MP hierarchs seem to be a testing of forces, a clarification of the situation, rather than steps to change the status.
And from the point of view of social dynamics, the time is ungrateful.
Perhaps I will say a sacrilegious thing, but to look at the situation soberly, distance yourself from the fact that we are talking about the MP as a church.
View it as a political group. It be haves this wayand that way, it wants to win. What exactly doesit want to win? What kind of future does it want to have if it wins, and how will it use it. And finally, at the end of any story, there is the issue of money. The more spiritual the topic, the less people talk about it, but in fact, monasteries and dioceses represent land, represent money. And where there is money, there is influence. What money was used to maintain them, who was the beneficiary of their influence?
The position of the MP has become shaky if movements away from the MP have begun, but they have a specific flock. Their believers are easy to manage with in the pre-determined Moscow narrative, but it is difficult to adapt them to a real change in discourse.
So far, I see that the part of the situation in which there are some vague movements to change the status of the MP is an information operation. Andthe lower-level haters who are being cheated and led are a psychological operation.
To a large extent, what is happening in public is manual control of texts, where the enemy is adding fuel to the fire. The church issue issensitive, and the enemy will spin it. On the otherhand, texts on social media are not sociologically reliable – whet her there are people with real sentiments behind the texts should bein vestigated.
But there is another element inherent in this social group (meaning the MPs – ed.). They require an image of an enemy, a «satan». And if there is no enemy, then one must be made up, and the easiest way is to hate those around you. Thisis human nature. Hatred is a manifestation of aggression, and external aggression is often a manifestation of dislike and dissatisfaction with oneself. Any aggressive text is an indicator of the problem of this social group. Behind the texts of «useful idiots» there may be a priest in Russian uniform who constantly encourages and praises them, blesses them, and so on.
Oleksandr Paliy, author of nine books on thehistory of Ukraine, analyst:
The Moscow Patriarchate is confused. They donot know what the dynamics will be. If they start to lose both churches and influence, they may at the last moment «pounce» on the OCU with brotherly embraces. This is not for unity, but forabsorption and self-salvation.
But until they are sure how the future will develop, they will resist. While they do not fully understand how quickly the destruction of the MP will take place, they would like to wait it out, but it is not working out very well.
I certainly welcome the attention and help of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but I do not see how they would really accept this help. The MP community has not gotten rid of the bans on communion and concelebration, and they do not actually require this help.
Afterword
We do not know whether there is a more straightforward text than the one delivered by the head of the main theological school of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, Silvestr Stoichev, with its English translation. «We don’t need anyone,» says Bishop Sylvester. In fact, this is one hundred per cent the same as what we readin the group of believers of the Moscow Patriarchate. «We don’t need anyone,» the MP believers repeat, layering insults and contempt for the OCU, journalists, and the authorities. At leaston their part, this is an honest statement.
However, we hope that instead of imitating retreat and intrigue, those who are really trying to do something good for the once powerful structure of the MP in Ukraine will finally understand that the figures of sociological research (60 per cent want a complete ban on the MP, and another 20 per cent want a significant restriction) are much more realistic than the intricate conclusions of «unity theorists». That the transitions to the OCU are not «backstage insidious strategies of the enemies of unity», but rather embodied sociology multiplied by the cumulative experience of dissatisfaction with the activities and inactivity of the MP on the part of Ukrainian society. And maybe they too, as many believers and clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate have done so far, will finally take their real step to wards the Church, which continues to repeat: our doors are open to all.
Orthodox Ukraine
